Security model

Built so Relay cannot read your bookmarks.

Relay syncs bookmarks through an end-to-end encrypted, zero-knowledge vault. Your password stays in the browser, bookmark contents are encrypted before upload, and the backend stores only encrypted vault data plus limited operational metadata.

Security receipt

Password sentNo
Readable bookmarksNo
PermissionsBookmarks + storage + identity
Review statusPlanned
End-to-end encrypted Zero-knowledge vault No analytics SDK Independent review planned
Data boundary

What Relay can and cannot see

Relay can store encrypted vault data

The server needs the encrypted blob, a derived vault lookup key, browser-limit metadata, rate-limit metadata, and plan state to operate sync.

Relay cannot read bookmark contents

Readable bookmark titles, URLs, folders, and profiles are encrypted in the browser before upload. The password is not sent to Relay.

Relay can enforce ownership

Sensitive actions require a local ownership token recovered only after a browser decrypts the vault with the correct password.

Relay cannot reset your password

Password recovery would require Relay to hold a decryption path. Relay intentionally does not.

Extension surface

Extension permissions

Relay requests only the permissions needed for bookmark sync, local bookmark tools, and the optional passkey handoff:

Optional passkeys

Passkeys approve a browser; they do not replace vault encryption

Relay stores the passkey public key and limited credential metadata needed for verification. The encrypted local password wrapper is split between an approved browser and Relay's server, so neither side can unlock it alone. Biometric data and device PINs stay with the operating system or passkey provider and are never sent to Relay.

Local controls

Health, Tidy, and Undo stay browser-side

Library health checks, canonical URL-copy detection, local bookmark organization, Undo snapshots, and action result messages are computed from this browser's bookmark tree and local storage. They do not require Relay to read plaintext bookmarks on the server.

Verification

Independent verification roadmap

Relay is preparing for an independent browser-extension security review. We will publish only completed review summaries, not future-tense certification claims. The planned review scope is:

Current status: no third-party certification has been claimed yet. Chrome Web Store distribution is the normal install path, and independent audit evidence will be added after completion.
Disclosure

Report a security issue

Please use the support page for a coordinated reporting path. Do not send passwords, full bookmark exports, sensitive URLs, or exploit playbooks in an initial report.

Contact Relay support

Open the Relay Trust Center